Thursday, 5 March 2020

Fraud avoidance is a matter of knowledge, care and process.



The one thing that struck me in over 35 years of Credit Management is the way in which any company that encounters fraud or is drawn into it, bunkers down and keeps it private; essentially, the embarrassment is just too much to take.

The result of this of course is that the extent of fraud is not formally advertised or measured and this creates a vacuum into which we all fall, never quite learning from our mistakes or those of others. Training in fraud avoidance is rarely considered or indeed available to the average IT Reseller for example.

I recall so many occasions where I encountered Resellers in difficulty as a consequence of both internal and external fraud. A common feature was new recruits with impressive sales statistics that were subsequently found to be fraudulent. Sales essentially to acknowledged clients but where delivery was to ‘mates’ or ‘acquaintances’. It’s so easy to do this for two or three months and then moving on to another employer.

Another common fraud is the false identity tactic. This involves placing an order using a known legitimate client account but requesting delivery to another location or collection of goods. On one such occasion, I was working late in the office when an order to one of our long established Resellers was rejected by order processing. It was rejected as the value was over 60K, the Reseller client already owed some 50K and the account credit line was 80K, previously enough to deal with normal run rate activity. Unusually too, the order was for IBM product the Reseller did not normally purchase and the delivery address was a known obscure North London postcode we had previously flagged for possible fraud. The Reseller Sales Director insisted the order was good and what was more, their client had provided notification of prepayment. I advised caution but given the request verbally and in writing, we allowed release.

At the point where the invoice to this Reseller became payable, we began to encounter resistance and it was only my relationship with owner and Finance Director that finally squeezed out an admission they had been had. Prepayment from their client was not received and they had a problem therefore in settling our invoice.

Despite our reservation on release and their insistence the deal was good I had to reach an agreement in order to assist them in settling our invoice. This entailed a credit note for much of the profit mark up and allowing them six months to pay our invoice, which they did. It helped that we had known and traded very profitably with the Reseller for two decades or more and continued trade after this incident.

Resellers export more than ever before and those that do frequently fall prey to MTIC fraud involvement, mostly innocently because they simply do not have any knowledge or understanding of its characteristics. Many feel they are not likely targets so control and process checks are minimal or non-existent. The cost to a business of this type of fraud is absolutely huge in terms of unpaid VAT.

In recent HMRC publicised cases, some fairly established Reseller business have been named but my guess is that for every one named, there’s another 6 out there that haven’t been caught yet.

Companies sensibly spend money investing in avoidance of bad debt, whether this be through checking prospective clients/suppliers and deals via receivables finance or credit insurance. Too little however is spent in keeping abreast of fraud, understanding how it happens or seeking guidance in steps to counter it effectively.


Wednesday, 10 April 2019

Prevent gross margin erosion when increasing Sales targets.



Avoiding a sting in the tail of increased Sales targets.

From a credit management perspective, there are two particularly challenging periods for anyone involved in determining and setting appropriate credit lines to facilitate business.

The first is in the case of acquisition, where one has to review acquired clients and respective lines, more so when there is client overlap and the second, when Sales are faced with increased targets and it’s this latter one I focus on.

It merits focus because this is one area and activity that is often mismanaged with dire consequences to both risk and more importantly, diminished gross margin.

If you sell to either corporate or SMB clients, you will generally have a designated number of accounts to manage. Let’s assume you have some thirty accounts; some will trade erratically, some may not trade at all currently and only a handful, perhaps 6-10 deliver consistent orders. Not only this, the bulk of your sales, (perhaps as high as 70%), are achieved through just three accounts.

Invariably, major accounts that deliver most revenue are more demanding of you when you try to sell them more. I’ll wager they also provide the lowest gross margin but volume and corresponding Vendor discount generates just enough to keep such margin above water.

Salespeople, certainly in IT Distribution, a sector in which account manager changes are too frequent, are creatures of habit. When targets increase, the immediate response is to go to those that trade regularly. Faced, for example, with increasing sales by say 10%, first port of call are  major accounts, those currently perhaps delivering the lowest gross margin yield. They may already be pressured with restricted credit lines but this cuts no ice, targets have to be achieved.
Buyers meanwhile, are astute, more so those who happen to be principal clients. An approach to increase orders will invariably meet with the response of “sure, but I’ll need something in return, better pricing, higher marketing co-op funds or a more generous volume discount”. A hard pill to swallow perhaps, but concern gets buried by the pressing need to hit target. The net result may be an increase in sales but an overall damaging further decline in gross margin return.

It’s quite something for a Distributor to have to sit and wait for Vendor volume rebates in order to determine final profit or indeed visible above the line return in trading with major clients. Competition is fierce but this constant repetitive focus of trade with major clients has undoubtedly contributed to downward Distributor margins over years.

There is a solution, indeed there always has been a solution.

Many years ago, having tired of the constant barrage for increased credit lines from Account Managers faced with increased targets, I set about devoting time and effort into working with them to show how best to achieve targets, this time using the full breadth and scope of their managed accounts. Sales Managers sadly had reached a point where they had little time to sit with their team or indeed train them in basic simple rudimentary research and selling techniques. Their time was spent updating spreadsheets.

The very first time I did this, I picked the most onerous persistent Account Manager and made arrangements to have him sit with me for an hour or so. I had in the meanwhile obtained readily available information on performance across his database. This included current sales, year to date sales, cumulative sales, gross margin by account and average gross margin. I also researched his current non trading accounts, irregular buyers, those with no credit line and had his total credit availability matched to current debt level.

He had 20 accounts assigned to him with just four major accounts contributing 78% of his sales. Their limits were restrictive in terms of accommodating more and gross margin achieved against these three averaged just 2.5%.
 He also had 9 active accounts where balances were less than 50% of credit line capacity. Some of these had healthy credit lines but clearly underused. The average gross margin returned by this group was however 7%.
The remaining 7 accounts had no credit limit. Four of these had traded historically with cumulative sales and margin evidenced and three, had no transaction history at all.

I took the three with no trading history or credit line. I showed him that all three merited a credit line and asked him why they were not trading. He replied that he had not had the time to look at them. I showed him their websites, nature of business and the profile of products supplied. His interest heightened.

I looked at the four accounts that had clearly been regular buyers in the past but which became lapsed accounts. I asked if he had called any of them. He said that he had called two of them but they bought from others because we could not match price and account manager changes pushed them away. He said this without even blinking!
I again showed him their websites, cumulative sales that had been achieved along with gross margin return. I also told him that up to 100K of credit was available against this group.

I took issue with the 9 accounts that were utilising less than 50% of their combined credit. His response was typical, “My notes showed these accounts were specked by previous account managers and opportunity was limited” he said. I once more followed the routine of showing him their websites, product portfolio and better gross margin yield of these accounts. I advised him not only were they using less than 50% of credit availability, I could add another 200K of credit and as a salesman, he should know that no business stands still and constantly changes; what they may had done two years ago is not what they now do. He looked sheepish.

I finally touched on his four top clients and showed him why credit availability was strained. I also showed him a comparison of gross margin return of just these four compared to three years prior showing a decline from 4%.

I assured him that if he dedicated time to his under- utilised credit availability and made the calls, I would provide the credit necessary for him to not only hit his 10% sales target but smash it with the bonus of a better margin return against sales achieved. He surprised me in truth in doing just that and what is more, he shared his experience with others in his Sales Group who then similarly wanted to have their database usage reviewed in similar fashion.

It is a sad reflection nonetheless that basic research and analysis of client buying habits across databases is seemingly no longer a function that Sales people or their managers have time for. It does however demonstrate how Credit can be an incredibly valuable business development tool; quite why it does not yet appear in any Credit job specification is bewildering.

I recall a Sales visit to a major client as the Company wanted to pitch for more of their business. This was a major risk client where gross margins were perilously thin, almost zero, where credit was fully stretched and risk was high and worsening. The pitch was three months sales at cost and a slightly higher volume rebate. Even this offer was turned down as others ‘gave more’ apparently. Unsurprisingly, the 200m turnover Reseller went bust some 3-4 years later causing quite a stir.

Chasing existing revenue streams for more when capacity is limited or restricted is folly. Invariably, if you target such sales singularly or repetitively, client demands on you will guarantee lower gross margin return. Seeking the best possible return against a client database often provides more than ample headroom to not only increase sales but make significant inroad to better margin yield.
It’s a simple and rewarding way of avoiding the sting in the tail of increased targets.

Thursday, 14 February 2019

BETA DISTRIBUTION - Behind the Headlines



 
Beta Distribution – Behind the Headlines

The recent move into insolvency and Administration in October 2018 appeared to shock many in the sector, but should it have been a surprise? Were there signs of difficulty in recent years and was there anything that could have alerted those in risk management to better monitor and control risk and exposure?

Outwardly, all seemed fine in October 2017 when the company filed yet another apparently positive and optimistic set of results with sales hitting a high of 186m and profit before tax of 1.2m. All the usual headline financials such as working capital and net worth were sound. Sure, cash balances were substantially reduced to 243K but business reporting agencies were perfectly happy to retain credit rating guides and suggested credit limit.
Understandable perhaps when looking at profit and loss figures such as this:-




2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Sales

126,930,885
139,248,014
164,887,622
166,332,587
186,076,920
Profit before Tax
596,957
1,616,637
1,618,071
1,218,717
1,186,832

Or indeed, balance sheet numbers such as this:-



2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Working Capital
7,313,577
8,467,564
7,998,659
8,747,191
8,957,499
Net Worth
7,523,838
8,813,334
8,476,645
9,420,362
9,720,394
Cash Balances
1,526,538
703,886
2,627,460
1,830,702
243,621



The 2017 Strategic Review accompanying accounts was overtly buoyant, talking of opening sales offices across major European Countries but was everything rosy and positive or were there underlying issues that perhaps should have indicated difficulties ahead?

It’s vital for those involved in risk management to read behind the headlines and absorb the minutest change or movement in a company’s filed financial statements. Singularly they may not infer risk but appear simply as oddities that can so easily be dismissed when looking at performance generally. Collectively however, over a period of time they can provide sufficient enough warning that outward success may not be as it seems.

Beta Distribution was incorporated in 1985 and had been well known in the sector as a small but growing focused Distributor and hit the headlines a little more in 2011 when sales passed the 100m mark. Principally, the company was under the control of two owners, one of who had overall control with a 75% stake.

Its public difficulties became known with press articles in September 2018 suggesting Credit Insurers had cut or removed credit lines, restricting supplier credit and the ability to source product. In that same month, the company filed for an extension of its fiscal year end from March 2018 to September 2018. Both factors undoubtedly proved to be the catalyst for its final collapse into Administration on the 2nd November 2018.

Some private companies, almost invariably owned by one or two principal shareholders and which outwardly have both history and successful growth, can show signs of what may be termed management autocracy or mini-fiefdoms and this is when control and direction often goes awry.
They are often characterised by excessive director loans, related party transactions and statement of affairs where pronouns such as “I” and “My” are profligate; “my Board of Directors, “my team and I” are perfect examples. It’s also true that in reviewing prior year statements, plans and projections are rarely achieved.

Getting to 100m Sales in Distribution is quite a milestone but hitting the highs required to gain traction, more so post 2010 given rampant consolidation where so many medium sized and yet still major Distributors were swallowed up by much bigger players, is an altogether much more difficult thing to achieve.

According to the Joint Administrators report filed in December 2018, Directors reasons for failure were that the company had suffered a cash loss of some 14m on foreign exchange currency contracts and furthermore, a report by the company’s advisers also noted an overstatement in stock of around 10m. The cut in credit lines and breaching bank overdraft and loan levels almost appear superfluous given the astonishing value of currency loss and stock overstatement.

Administrators report also shows Directors’ loans as per the Statement of Affairs totalled 1.9m and approximately 2.5m of share capital issued by Beta Distribution Plc to the two Directors remains unpaid. As far back as 2013, financial statements made reference to a payment made to Directors for precisely this reason.

The report also shows the Company having only a 90% stake in the Dutch BV but filed financial statements show it to be 100% (unless things changed post financial statements of 2017). The BV Company has also now moved to bankruptcy/liquidation.


Behind the Headlines
While some points have already been raised, from a risk management perspective there were more to consider. 

Operational shifts such as these for example:-

  • In 2013 there was a resignation of Auditors. Such an event always merits closer scrutiny
  • In 2014 came the first mention of Beta Export Partnership, a foray into Europe
  • In 2015 came the formation of the LLP OC396910, a services company into which were transferred all Beta Distribution employees. There was no clear indication in accounts or elsewhere why this was required or necessary.
  • In 2016 the first full year figures for the European subsidiary showed sales in the region of 25m with UK sales down
  • In 2018 came the acquisition of The Content Wall. Price paid or how purchase was funded was not indicated. (It should be noted here that TCW holding company was not acquired).
  • In 2018, the company requested an extension of its fiscal year from March 2018 to September 2018.

A review of significant accounting and finance movements or changes, also reveal the following:-


  • Repetitive historical presence of Director loans and related party transactions
  • Auditor resignation in 2013
  • Payment to Directors of 1.6m in 2013, Directors agreeing to subscribe for shares. (There was no further reference in subsequent financial statements).
  • Lack of clarity in Director remuneration post LLP introduction and ‘clouding’ of Administration costs
  • Shift of UK salary costs to the LLP in 2015 which filed abbreviated unaudited accounts
  • Unwarranted increase in annual administration costs compared to sales achieved
  • Anomalous ratio movement between trade debtors/creditors
  • Erratic and Increasing dependence on invoice discounting facility
  • Static UK sales and increased European sales in 2016-2017
  • Rare and substantial dividend payments of 1.6m in 2015 and 650K in 2017
  • Slowness in collection of Receivables
  • Financial statements for 2016 lumped invoice discounting and bank loans into one figure. Previously they reported separately.
  • In accounts filed for 2015 there is no mention of currency speculations or values yet those filed for 2016 do and make reference to corresponding 2015 currency commitments  
  • Audited accounts for 2016 show employee headcount as 6 but those for 2017 reflect back and reference 2016 headcount of 12
  • Format for showing cash flow movement changed in year ended 2015.
  • Analogous increase in net debt annually. This almost doubled between 2014 and 2017


Financial statements are about movement and performance in the P&L and how much of this is reflected in the balance sheet, which of course is supposed to balance. One needs to keep track of salient movements and note variances or anomalies across both. There are occasions when simple review of balance sheet elements can reveal much more than bold headline numbers.
An example in this case would be that of the ratio between trade debtors and creditors, level of borrowing against receivables and increasing net debt.




2013
2014
2015
2016
2017
Trade Debtors
23,160,000
25,600,000
33,500,000
37,500,000
37,900,000
Trade Creditors
17,300,000
16,900,000
20,000,000
24,000,000
20,000,000
% ratio

74.70%
66.02%
59.70%
64.00%
52.77%







Invoice Discounting
16,300,000
17,900,000
24,300,000
29,200,000
33,400,000
% ratio

70.38%
69.92%
72.54%
77.87%
88.13%







Net Debt
14,757,879
17,232,562
23,806,173
27,331,505
33,093,040


Things appear to go wrong in 2014 when Beta begins its foray into Europe. While revenue there grew quickly from around 9m to 45m in 2017, funding and indeed managing such European growth can prove challenging, more so when one’s core UK business begins to plateau or slide and receivables funding availability dries out.

Company’s net debt almost doubled in a period of three years (2014-2017). It is also during this period that the company began to engage more forcefully in foreign exchange derivative contracts in order to mitigate exchange rate risks but quite why it became so extensive is puzzling. Playing the currency risk game requires expertise and above all, a controlled and managed approach, which clearly is not evident given the apparent astonishing loss of 14m.
I sense Credit Insurers took note of 2015 and pulled back a little before taking flight in 2017.

Auditing too should be questioned given such losses and indeed the over-statement of stock to the tune of 10m. This equates to almost 50% of stock value listed in the 2017 results, a level of stock write down I’ve not seen in over 40 years.

Hindsight is wonderful. Looking back at things can reveal mistakes and oversights but ultimately, any significant insolvency of loss merits a look back and review, so that lessons may be learnt.


Give yourself time and space to read through financial statements. If your office environment is noisy or distracting, move yourself to a quit zone with pen, paper and a calculator. Jot down observations, double check and then draft up your own report, even in a summarised format. If you have questions, then ensure you call your client and obtain answers. Companies don’t really topple over overnight; there is either a phased period of decline or one of erratic or selective performance and reporting. Above all, don’t rely solely on either a business report rating/guide or indeed the insured level of cover held.


Thursday, 20 September 2018

Getting Paid - it's really down to you.



I’m sure I am not alone in feeling a sense of frustration that provision of goods on open credit terms seems to treated by too many in Credit as a ‘parlous’ occupation, one in which those dastardly customers will take one’s goods and simply not pay.

It’s a fact that any post on social or business networks about such issues as DSO, debt collection, enforcement and prompt payment codes are guaranteed to elicit huge response, some practical and sensible with others bordering on obsessive suspicion of debtor intentions. Throughout my career in credit, I never once thought of them as ‘debtors’, preferring to call them clients or receivables as this in truth is really what they are.

Any sensible rational person responsible for receivables knows precisely why occasions arise and clients fail to pay on time or at all. Almost every one of these reasons can be addressed and prevented to allow frictionless trade, continued profitable supply, extended client relationships and ease in collection.

Some in Credit are perfectly happy to perform functions and routines designed to maximise receivables within their own remit but often fail to act in dealing with issues that are not. Disputes are a part of trade, our job is to limit these and work swiftly to rectify them. Terms are or should be a direct Credit responsibility. Credit policy should be written by Credit and be known to everyone within an organisation. Credit should have set agreed sign-offs in matters of protracted or difficult client disputes. Credit should have absolute control of held orders to limit or eradicate them. Absolutely everything must be done to ensure order flow is uninterrupted. It can generally be achieved or hugely optimised if one area which has the skill and expertise (Credit) is given the responsibility.

Not everyone engaged in Credit is given the full range of tools to perform the function successfully but in every such case, I urge you to fight your own war and ensure you present unassailable evidence that you can deliver. If something is broken along the chain and out of your remit, don’t just sit back and wait for it to be fixed, take a lead and make it part of your remit or sphere of influence.

When you have full control, you know exactly how much cash is going to come in and when. I know I did.

In over 30 years, I never once failed to deliver against forecast having achieved what I called optimised collection rates. We knew exactly our volume of receipts and overlaying graphs of daily cash receipts over a month’s cycle over the course of the year was a uncannily like ‘groundhog day’ but less boring. It was certainly refreshing never to have a Finance Director ask me how much cash we were expecting and when. This was based on client terms, known payment cycles, known minimised dispute percentages, known direct debit clients and control of risk profiles. It helped to have incentives and commission paid to credit in addition to base salary or as part of it, in achieving optimised cash collection rates. It could certainly never have been achieved without the broader remit of Credit.

The CICM has done some terrific things in terms of Prompt Payment Codes but we must never overlook the fact that we in Credit and indeed the companies we work for have by far and away the greatest effect in how clients pay us.

If we deliver good service consistently and as required, apply ourselves diligently to receivables and have full control of them, getting paid on time will never be a problem.


Saturday, 7 April 2018

CREDIT (R)EVOLUTION



There are undoubtedly many who are happy to fulfil roles comfortably ensconced in roles narrowed simply to cash, risk management and order to cash processes. Clearly, these elements remain critical and so they should be; they contribute greatly to working capital, managed bad debts with efficiency and savings in the OTC process, all of which secure or aid profit retention and business growth.

But are these sufficient? The answer is no, these are no longer ‘singularly’ the answer or requirement.

Technology has driven business thought and pattern, accelerated enormously with the advent of the web in the late nineties and globalisation that followed beyond 2000. Consumerisation and global markets along with increased competition have pressured ‘old style’ corporate structures, rendering many of those old recognised divisional structures and silo’s redundant.

Companies continue to change the way they do business and their composite divisions simply have to consider new ways of delivering more of what they so, more cheaply, more efficiently and above all, with greater value-add and delivery to business growth and profitability.

Successful companies are those that encourage and nurture an attitude in which every employee is a direct contributor to business growth and profit. This has never been more relevant in traditional roles, many of them threatened by the relentless march of technology, innovation, robotics, automation and now artificial intelligence. One has to diversify and look at broadening the range of services offered and this means some overlap across divisional silos. As an example, I found that Sales Directors and Sales Managers were so pressured to hit targets they had little time to research and review what they sold and to who, so consumed were they with time constraints and working with excel spreadsheets. I created new ways of stimulating sales activity and business development using tools and information readily held by finance and credit.

Assuming ‘there will always be a place for risk and collections’ and nothing else will eventually render the role of Credit Manager obsolescent, given the speed and acceleration of changes we have witnessed. It’s true indeed that in the last 15 years we have seen a gradual shift away from recognized finance delivery and a progression to process delivery, automation and efficiency.

To remain pivotal and retain value, the credit manager of today and the future will need to extend the boundaries they work within, even at the risk of losing the ‘credit’ tag.
Some dislike mission statements. I did too until I created one of my own that I felt more at ease with.

“Provide the company with a quality credit/business management service designed to create, stimulate, expand, secure and support business opportunity and profit”

You will note there is no specific reference here to words like cash, debt, risk, bad debt, or process.  
To achieve this, one must broaden activity, deliver real change and influence decision makers with tangible positive return. Delivering just what one is asked for is no longer sustainable.


Monday, 3 July 2017

Get out there and meet your clients


In order to be successful, Distribution Credit Management must offer a competitive, selling, commercial and financial advantage. It’s not just about giving credit, collecting money and managing risk as quite frankly one can easily outsource or automate any or all of these three functions and achieve passable results.
To optimise this financial discipline and deliver constant above par performance requires a number of additional skills and uniform application.

My mission statement made a point of omitting usual words such as Cash, Collection, Dispute Resolution or Bad Debt. It did so because Distribution Credit Management has to provide a company and its clients with a credit management service designed to create, expand, secure and support business opportunity and profit.

In my early years in IT Distribution, I recognized that getting to know Resellers was absolutely crucial in being able to deliver against the mission statement I created and this in so many ways, demonstrated to Sales that intent was there to support their sales efforts. In my first three years with Ideal Hardware Ltd, I consciously set about meeting the top 250 accounts over a period of some three years and thereafter, made repeat visits across the UK and EMEA regions as and when circumstances demanded. Visits were not limited to just those top 250.

Distributors need ‘touch points’ with Resellers far more than they do with Manufacturers but sadly for the channel, few people meet face to face beyond perhaps designated account or product managers. The more touch points one has, the greater the solidity and strength of the relationship.

Managing the deal and the risk, being able to grant the credit and being fully conversant with Reseller history and plans give review of financial and other risk information enormous clarity.

Continuous regular touch with a client is just so important to the overall trading relationship and I’m quite frankly staggered that many in Credit are often viewed as customer service orientated only by phone; in other words, they have no business meeting client owners or client directors and belong in a lower pecking order, talking or meeting only with accounts payable or financial controllers.


Get out there and meet clients; it will not only enrich the relationship but will significantly broaden your knowledge, skill and expertise and will hugely increase confidence and raise you and your team’s profile. 

Tuesday, 18 October 2016

Who is best equipped to make commercial business risk decisions?


I’ve long held a view that all too often, those in credit management report to finance functions that rarely have a grasp of risk management, loss mitigation, business continuity or business development. I guess we all have examples to recall but here’s just one of mine.
A German client I had visited in early days of trade had built a solid relationship with us allowing us to operate frequently at gross margins of more than 8% on components and in particular hard drives. The first three years went exceptionally well with increasing credit lines and credit insured availability, the latter peaking at around 700K. 

In the fourth year, I noted a lack of crispness in response from the client, visited them again and obtained interim management accounts that did suggest a dip in performance. I explained we would continue support but in a much ‘tighter’ fashion and insisted on provision of regular monthly management accounts and prompt settlement of amounts due.
I dropped the credit line to 500K and managed to reduce the debt in line with this lower level within two months. The first two interim management accounts provided suggested the ‘wobble’ was still evident but payment had nonetheless been prompt in those two months following my last visit. There was of course internal pressure to allow trade to the insured line of 700K again but I refused.

Four months later, the client called to say they had real difficulty meeting payment due and asked for a little more time and an element of continued supply. At this point, the debt was just short of 500K.

In creating an element of early bad debt provision given payment issues, my Finance Director’s view was that given insurance cover, stopping supply and insistence on immediate payment was the best course of action. I naturally countered that this was not the best way of mitigating risk for a number of reasons, not least of which was that we were well short of our aggregate first loss on our insurance policy so would have to take the almost full 500K hit. He could not quite see this but I won the argument by adding I could bring down the debt by visiting once more and working a phased ‘withdrawal’.

Over the next six months, and while continually reviewing payment, credit line and financial information provided, we successfully whittled the debt down to just 80K and all this while keeping debt within the credit insurance reportable period. It was at this point that the client moved to insolvency resulting in a claim of 80K instead of 500K. 

Not only had we reduced the bad debt level, we had actually managed to transact over those six months a further 1.2m of business at 8% gross margin.

Simple logic in terms of risk mitigation but in essence, demonstrates the real tangible difference a specialist credit management function offers in viewing the overall picture and potential end result as opposed to a finance driven cut and thrust call.

There is only one function that can deliver sound risk business decisions – it’s not Sales, it’s not Finance, it’s Credit.


Edward Pacey FCICM FACP
07502246558